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The way in which Hempel gradualised the theory of dispositions is closely
akin to the way in which Reichenbach gradualised the theory of meaning.
In the preceding chapter we saw to what Hempel’s gradualisation amounts:
sentences by which dispositions are described - reduction sentences - are
given a probabilistic shape. In the present chapter we shall see in what
Reichenbach’s gradualisation consists: the sentences by which scientific
terms are defined - so-called direct sentences - are only probabilistically
related to the definiendum. Reichenbach’s gradualisation and its resemblance
to Hempel’s approach are discussed in the first two sections of this chapter.
Section 3 contains an excursion on Reichenbach and Carnap. In Section 4
Reichenbach’s views are applied to beliefs and desires. In the final chapter
it is shown that the gradualisations of both Hempel and Reichenbach suffer
from the same flaw, and an attempt will be made to remedy the defect.
1. Reichenbach’s gradualisation:
probability meaning
In Experience and Prediction Hans Reichenbach distinguishes between direct
and indirect propositions (Reichenbach 1938, 46-47). The distinction is an
unalloyed neo-positivistic product. Direct propositions are the familiar
observation sentences capable of direct verification; indirect propositions are
indirectly verified, which means that they are reducible to other propositions
capable of direct verification. Among Reichenbach’s examples of directly
verifiable sentences are ‘There is a table’, ‘This steamer has two funnels’,
‘The thermometer indicates 15° centigrade’. Examples of indirectly verifiable
propositions are ‘The temperature at the center of the sun is forty million
degrees’ and ‘There are craters on the invisible half of the Moon’.
As might be expected, the difference between direct and indirect
verification is far from absolute. Not only does it presuppose a certain
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idealisation (in the sense that strict verification is forever impossible), it also
depends on our decision to use either logical or physical meaning
(Reichenbach 1938, 40-41). Physical meaning is defined by the demand of
physical possibility of verification; that electrons have a spin is strictly
speaking physically unverifiable. Logical meaning, on the other hand, is a
much wider notion. A certain statement about the world in the year 2003,
for example, is in 1996 physically meaningless although it does have a
logical meaning. In the end every sentence that does not entail a
contradiction is logically meaningful.
The distinction between physical and logical meaning is a matter of
decision rather than of truth-character. The same goes for the question as to
what the direct propositions are about - that question too is decided on
practical grounds. They might be about "concreta" (physical, observable
objects), impressions (perceptions and other sensations), atoms, the
elementary particles of physics, or about yet something else. As is well
known, Reichenbach chooses the first option. I will follow him in making
that choice. Concreta, I take it, constitute the foundations upon which the
scientific edifice is erected; scientific propositions that resist reduction to
sentences denoting concreta should at least arouse suspicion.
The interesting question, of course, is what ‘reduction’ exactly
means here. What does it mean to say that a proposition about an event
horizon, i.e. the border of a black hole where the escape velocity equals the
speed of light, ‘is reducible to’ a class of observation sentences?
Cosmologists in the wake of Stephen Hawking detect an event horizon by
measuring electromagnetic radiation emitted from a shrinking star, and by
comparing the measured signals with the predictions of quantum field theory
and general relativity. The cosmologist’s claim that in an event horizon the
photons ‘hover’, i.e. neither escape from the hole nor fall back into it, is
based on various sentences concerning outcomes of measurements made with
miscellaneous instruments. Each of those instruments, we assume, is placed
on our planet, thousands of millions of miles removed from what they are
observing: the happenings in an event horizon. What is the relation between
the (indirect) statement that the photons in an event horizon hover, and the
(direct) statements about results of measurements? Reichenbach emphasised
that his own answer to this question differs from that given by early
positivists. Below I explain both kinds of answer and their differences; in
doing so I stay close to Reichenbach’s phrasing and notation.
Early positivists have regarded the relation between direct and
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indirect statements as an equivalence, expressed in the following definition:
(VIII.1): IS ≡ {ds1, ..., dsn}.
(VIII.1) states that the indirect statement, IS, has the same meaning as the
set of direct sentences, {ds1, ... dsn} - I will call that set Z. Although
Reichenbach does not say so, IS is a propositional function of Z. Each dsi
(1≤i≤n) contains, as its descriptive terms, only terms that refer to concreta.
(VIII.1) does not imply that Z consists in a conjunction of ds1, ..., dsn; Z may
contain disjunctions, implications, negations, et cetera. In a simple case of
temperature measurement, for example, Z contains primarily disjunctions. In
Reichenbach’s words: "for measuring the temperature of our chamber we
may use a mercury thermometer, or an alcohol thermometer, et cetera. This
"or" will be transferred into the class of direct propositions equivalent to the
statement concerning the temperature of our chamber." (Reichenbach 1938,
48). In this case (VIII.1) could take the form of:
(VIII.2): IS ≡ [(ds1∧ds7∧ ... dsk) ∨
(dsk+1∧ ... ∧dsn) ∨ (ds2∧ ... ∧ds9)],
or any other disjunction of conjunctions of dsi (1≤i≤n).
Although (VIII.1) may thus be indifferent to the shape of Z (that is,
to the form of the propositional function), it cannot be indifferent to Z’s size
(i.e. to the number of direct sentences). For (VIII.1) makes sense only if Z
is finite. It thus implies, first, that the number of direct sentences from which
we infer IS is finite, and, second, that the non-equivalent sentences which
can be inferred from IS also constitute a finite class. Now Reichenbach
argued that whereas the first implication could be correct, the second is not.
In order to illustrate this asymmetry, he takes as an example of IS the
statement ‘At the interior of the sun the temperature is forty million
degrees’, abbreviated as A, and declares:
"It is true that the class of propositions from which we
start in order to infer A is a finite one, and even a
practically finite one; for what we have is always a finite
number of propositions. But the class of propositions
which we can infer from A is not finite. We may infer
from A that the temperature of a certain body, brought
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within a short distance r from the sun, would be T degrees;
we cannot perform this experiment .... There is an infinite
class of such sentences; by making r run through all
possible numerical values this class would be infinite. It is
therefore a grave mistake to think that the right side of
[(VIII.1)] can ever be practically given." (Reichenbach
(1970 (1938), 50).
Thinking that the right side of (VIII.1) can be given amounts to overlooking
the fact that in the typical cases IS has a surplus meaning compared to the
meaning of the propositional function of ds1, ..., dsn: the consequences
inferred from IS cannot all be inferred from ds1, ..., dsn. Hence Reichenbach
concludes that (VIII.1) is false, whereby the rigid positivistic theory of
indirect meaning loses its foundation.
We could of course try to repair things by postulating that the class
of direct sentences is not finite. Accordingly, we could transform (VIII.1)
into (VIII.3):
(VIII.3): IS ≡ {ds1, ... },
where the infinite {ds1, ... } might be called Z*, in order to distinguish it
from the finite class Z. But this manoeuvre is of no help. Since the
verification of all the sentences in Z* is physically impossible and logically
possible, the manoeuvre would entail that the members of Z* have only
logical, and no physical meaning. Such an entailment is of course not what
we had in mind: "we must realize that with this interpretation of indirect
sentences most propositions of physics are endowed with meaning only
because it is not logically impossible to count, term after term, an infinite
series. I do not think that such reasoning will convince anyone. Nobody
would take such a formal possibility into actual consideration; it is not this
logical possibility which leads us to accept the indirect sentences as
meaningful." (Reichenbach 1938, 53). For these and other reasons (such as
that the very existence of Z* is dubious), Reichenbach rejects (VIII.3)
together with (VIII.1). Consequently, he also rejects what (VIII.3) and
(VIII.1) embody, namely the concept of truth meaning. The latter concept,
which bifurcates in physical truth meaning and logical truth meaning
(analogues of physical and logical meaning - cf. above), is defined in the
truth theory of meaning (TTM). TTM is based on the following two
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principles:
TTM1: a proposition has a meaning if, and only if, it is verifiable as
true or false;
TTM2: two propositions have the same meaning if they obtain the
same determination as true or false by every possible observation;
(Reichenbach 1938, 30-31). As distinct from the truth theory of meaning,
Reichenbach devises his probability theory of meaning (PTM), in which
TTM1 and TTM2 have been replaced by their probabilistic counterparts, PTM1
and PTM2:
PTM1: a proposition has meaning if it is possible to determine a
degree of probability for the proposition;
PTM2: two propositions have the same meaning if they obtain the
same degree of probability by every possible observation;
(Reichenbach 1938, 54). Jointly, PTM1 and PTM2 define the concept of
probability meaning. In Reichenbach’s view, probability meaning is always
physical probability meaning; for in contrast with truth meaning, probability
meaning cannot be divided into physical probability meaning on the one
hand and logical probability meaning on the other.76
76 I quote Reichenbach’s justification without comment ("weight" is Reichenbach’s
word for the unknown truth value of a proposition; it is "a quantity in continuous scale
running from the utmost uncertainty through intermediate degrees of reliability to the
highest certainty"; the measure of weight is probability, cf. Reichenbach 1938, 23):
"Such a distinction [between logical and physical meaning - JP]
turns out to be superfluous because the combination of logical
possibility with weight does not furnish a concept distinct from
logical truth meaning; if it is logically possible to obtain a weight
for an sentence, it is also logically possible to obtain a verification.
Only physical reasons can exclude verification and at the same time
permit the determination of a weight; if we disregard the laws of
physics, we are in imagination free from physical experiments and
need not distinguish the possibility of a determination of the weight
and of verification. Thus logical probability meaning and logical
truth meaning are identical. Probability meaning, therefore, is always
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The counterpart in PTM of (VIII.1) is (VIII.4):
(VIII.4): IS {ds1, ..., dsn},
where {ds1, ..., dsn} is a finite class, to be called Z again, and where IS is
again a propositional function of Z. The sign ‘ ’ takes the place of ‘≡’; it
denotes a mutual probability relation, which Reichenbach names the
probability connection. (VIII.4) is equivalent to the conjunction of the
following two statements:
(VIII.5): IS {ds1, ..., dsn}
(VIII.6): IS {ds1, ..., dsn}.
(VIII.5) expresses that IS probably implies Z; it says that there are inferences
from IS to Z, which are not absolutely sure, since it may happen that IS is
true while Z is false. (VIII.6) claims the opposite; it says that Z probably
implies IS. Since both statements express probability inferences which pass
beyond observations, (VIII.4) can also serve as a counterpart of (VIII.3).
Moreover, (VIII.1) and (VIII.3) both are special cases of (VIII.4), whereby
TTM becomes a special case of PTM.
Reichenbach talks about the probability relation at many places, but
he discusses it at length in his Wahrscheinlichkeitslehre (Reichenbach 1935).
There he starts by investigating the nature of what he regards as a standard
probability statement (and thus, one might say, a standard IS), namely ‘the
probability of getting a face showing 6 when tossing this die is 1/6’.
According to Reichenbach this statement expresses a quantitative correlation
between members of different classes: it says that a member denoted by ‘a
face of this die is showing 6’ (belonging to the class of tosses yielding a 6)
is quantitatively related to members denoted by ‘a face of this die is shown’
physical probability meaning." (Reichenbach 1938, 55).
Reichenbach adds that "the probability theory of meaning may be considered as an
expansion of the truth theory of physical meaning in which the postulate of verifiability
is taken in a wider sense, including the physical possibility of determining either the
truth-value or a weight." (ibid.). Reichenbach therefore decides to include both TTM and
PTM under the name verifiability of meaning. The narrow sense of verification is then
referred to as ‘absolute verification’.
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(belonging to the class of all tosses). The relation is a probability
implication; it means that for every pair of events <xn,ym>, such that xn∈X
and ym∈Y where X is the class of tosses and Y is the class of tosses resulting
in 6, xn implies ym with degree of probability 1/6. On the basis of these
implications Reichenbach then re-establishes the ordinary classical
probability calculus.
2. Probability meaning: implications and
resemblance to Hempel’s probabilistic reduction sentences
In the present section I pursue Reichenbach’s notion of probability meaning
in greater depth. First, in 2.1, I compare probability meaning with Hempel’s
probabilistic reduction sentences; this comparison is only preliminary and
will be further developed in Chapter IX. Next, in 2.2 and 2.3, I discuss some
implications of probability meaning. They involve the distinction between
projection and reduction (2.2) and that between abstracta and illata (2.3).
2.1 Resemblance to probabilistic reduction sentences
From a formal point of view, the probability implication as conceived by
Reichenbach (cf. Section 1) closely resembles the way in which Hempel
gradualised the reduction sentences (cf. Chapter VII). Only two substitutions
(together with the corresponding adjustments) are required to obtain the
latter from the former: (i) the substitution of the reason sentence R(x) for the
indirect sentence IS, and (ii) the substitution of the set of pairs {<S-1, A-1>,
<S-2, A-2>, ..., <S-n, A-n>} for the set of direct sentences {ds1, ds2, ..., dsn}.
In addition to these formal similarities, there exists another
resemblance between Hempel’s approach and Reichenbach’s. Both Hempel
and Reichenbach champion the relative frequency interpretation of
probability. At the end of the preceding section I pointed out that
Reichenbach erects the classical probability calculus on the basis of his
newly conceived probability implications. This calculus is in need of an
interpretation, and Reichenbach bestows that of relative frequency on it, in
which probability is construed as a relation between events. The probability
of an event is then formally defined as the relative frequency in the long run
of that type of event within an infinite sequence of events. Hempel, for his
245
VIII: Reichenbach’s Probability Meaning
part, also espouses the frequency interpretation. For in talking about
reduction sentences that are only probabilistic Hempel explicitly refers to
statistical probability. Let us recall what we saw in Chapter VII, namely that
Hempel’s reading of the broad probabilistic reduction sentences (VII.12) and
(VII.13) is respectively:
For ... individuals that have the property R and are under
test conditions of kind S1 (S2, ...), the statistical probability
of responding in manner A1 (A2, ...) is r1 (r2, ...);
For ... individuals that are under test conditions of kind S1
(S2, ...) and respond in manner A1 (A2, ...), the statistical
probability of possessing the property R is r1 (r2, ...).
And of course, statistical probability is just another word for probability as
relative frequency, as Hempel himself acknowledges (Hempel 1965, 386ff).
The consensus between Hempel and Reichenbach about relative frequency
as the most suitable interpretation of probability is not all-encompassing:
there exist two minor differences.77 However, these differences do not undo
77 The first difference pertains to the scope of relative frequency. In Reichenbach’s
view, each probability statement should be interpreted as a statement about relative
frequency; any other interpretation is either nonsense or derivable from the frequency
interpretation (this is Reichenbach’s famous identity conception of probability). But
whereas for Reichenbach the relative frequency interpretation covers all probability
statements, Hempel’s view on the interpretation of probability is less polarised. Hempel
leaves room for other interpretations of probability, notably for inductive probability, i.e.
probability as a logical relation between hypothetical and evidential statements (Hempel
1965, 60; 282ff; 385ff). According to Hempel, the frequency interpretation is suitable for
some probability statements, but by no means for all.
The second difference concerns the length of the sequences by means of which
the relative frequency of an event is determined. Reichenbach frankly allows these
sequences to be infinite (reconstructing the probability of an event in this case as the
limit of its relative frequency). Hempel, on the other hand, displays some caution:
"... infinite series of performances are not realizable or observable, and the
limit-definition of statistical probability thus provides no criteria for the
application of that concept to observable empirical subject matter. In this
respect the limit-construal of probability is an idealized theoretical concept,
and criteria for its empirical application will ... have to involve some vague
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the important similiarity, namely that both philosophers bestow the relative
frequency interpretation upon probabilistic reduction sentences. In Hempel’s
case this is clear from his reading of (VII.12) and (VII.13), in Reichenbach’s
case it follows immediately from his unconditional consent to the frequency
interpretation. For clearly, if one applies the frequency interpretation to each
probabilistic sentence, then a fortiori one applies it to reduction sentences.
2.2. Reduction and projection
By far the largest part of indirect sentences, Reichenbach argues, is
connected to sentences about concreta merely through probability relations.
However, some indirect statements are related to direct statements through
(VIII.1). Those statements are completely reducible to direct ones.
Reichenbach’s example of a completely reducible statement is:
(VIII.7): The race of negroes has its home in Africa
(Reichenbach 1938, 94). (VIII.7) is an indirect statement, for it contains
indirectly verifiable terms: ‘the race of negroes’ does not denote a
concretum, and neither does ‘home’. But (VIII.7) is equivalent to:
(VIII.8): All negroes descend from forefathers who lived in Africa,
which contains, besides logical terms such as ‘all’, only terms that refer to
concreta (‘descend’, ‘forefather’). Since the meaning of (VIII.7) is the same
as the meaning of (VIII.8), (VIII.7) is completely reducible to (VIII.8).
Reichenbach calls the relation between (VIII.7) and (VIII.8) a reduction;
terms ... In particular, a statement specifying the limit of the relative frequency
of the result G in an infinite sequence of performances of random experiment
F has no deductive implications concerning the frequency of G in any finite
set of performances, however large it may be." (Hempel 1965, 387-388).
Hempel therefore concludes that statements about relative frequencies in finite runs can
never take the place of statements about limits of relative frequencies in infinite runs. By
that conclusion he separates himself from Reichenbach, who treats the two sorts of
statements as being interchangeable.
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(VIII.7) denotes a reductive complex and the expressions in (VIII.8) refer to
the internal elements of this complex (Reichenbach 1938, 110). An even
better example of a reduction is the relation between a wall and the bricks
of which it is built. Every statement about the wall (the reductive complex)
can be translated into a statement about the bricks (the internal elements).
"The wall has a height of three meters", for instance, can be translated as
"there are bricks stuck together by mortar and piled upon one another to the
height of three meters" (Reichenbach 1938, 105). However, we should bear
in mind that the wall is not dependent upon just bricks, but upon a certain
configuration of the bricks. In that sense, the reductive complex is more than
the whole of the internal elements. If all the bricks are hacked out and
distributed over the ground, the wall no longer exists but the bricks still do;
but if the bricks are cut to pieces, then neither they nor the wall can
continue to exist. This indicates that the relation of reduction, although based
upon logical equivalence, harbours a certain asymmetry:
"the existence of the complex is dependent on the
existence of the elements in such as way that the
nonexistence of the elements implies the nonexistence of
the complex. ... the latter statement is ... to be
distinguished from the converse relation according to
which the nonexistence of the complex would imply the
nonexistence of the elements ... this converse relation does
not hold" (Reichenbach 1938, 105-106).
Of course, if the bricks are arranged in certain ways, then the existence of
the bricks does imply the existence of the wall: although the internal
elements alone are not sufficient for the existence of the complex, they
become sufficient when they are related in a particular manner. Reichenbach
calls those relations constitutive relations. Together with a constitutive
relation, internal elements are equivalent to a reductive complex.
On the other hand, if indirect statements are not connected to direct
statements through (VIII.1) but through (VIII.4), then the former statements
denote projective complexes and the latter statements refer to external
elements. The probability connection itself is called a projection instead of
a reduction. Reichenbach gives the following example of a projection:
"We imagine a number of birds flying within a certain
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domain of space. The sun rays falling down from above
project a shadow-figure of every bird on the soil, which
characterizes the horizontal position of the bird. To
characterize the vertical position also, let us imagine a
second system of light rays running horizontally and
projecting the birds on a vertical plane which may be
represented by a screen of the kind employed in the
cinemas. We have, then, a pair of shadows corresponding
to every bird ... every proposition concerning the
movement of the birds is co-ordinated with a proposition
about the changes of the pairs of shadows." (Reichenbach
1938, 108).
In the example, every single bird is represented by a unique system of
marks, in the sense that each movement of the bird corresponds to a
movement of the shadows. The birds are not identical to the shadow pairs,
however, no matter how the pairs are arranged with respect to each other.
Instead, the birds are only projected unto the screen and the soil: they
constitute projective complexes of which the shadows are the external
elements. This means that no proposition about a bird is completely
reducible to a proposition about a shadow pair. Any talk about constitutive
relations is nonsensical here, for between propositions about the birds and
propositions about the shadows only probability connections exist:
"if we see the marks only, we may infer with a certain
probability that they are produced by birds, and if we see
the birds only, we may infer with a certain probability that
they will produce the marks. ... there is no strict relation
between the truth values of the co-ordinated propositions.
The proposition about the birds may be true, and that
about the marks may be false; conversely, the proposition
about the birds may be false, and that about the marks may
be true." (Reichenbach 1938, 109).
Reichenbach related his distinction between reductive complexes and
projective complexes to the time-honoured question of existence: see 2.3.
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2.3. Abstracta, illata and the question of existence
Projective complexes such as the birds referred to in Section 2.2 are called
illata, i.e. ‘inferred things’ (Reichenbach 1938, 212) - other examples of
illata complexes are radio waves, atoms, and all sorts of invisible gases.
Reductive complexes, on the other hand, are abstracta (Reichenbach 1938,
93; Reichenbach 1951, 263). Thus the race of negroes and the wall are both
abstracta, as are the political state, the Bodleian Library, and the American
army. We have seen in 2.2 that, since abstracta coincide with a particular
configuration of their elements whereas illata do not, the elements connected
to illata are called external while the elements that constitute abstracta are
dubbed internal.78
The difference between abstracta and illata has an interesting
significance for the traditional question of existence. Consider again the term
‘the race of negroes’. We have seen that this term denotes an abstractum,
but does this abstractum exist? May we say of the race of negroes that it has
an existence of its own? According to Reichenbach, we may and we may
not:
"We may say: ‘The race of Negroes exists.’ We know,
then, that this means the same as, ‘Many Negroes exist,
and they have certain biological qualities in common
which distinguish them from other people.’ We may also
say: ‘The race of Negroes does not exist.’ Then we have
to add: ‘Many Negroes exist, and any proposition
containing the term ‘the race of Negroes’ can be translated
into propositions concerning those Negroes." (Reichenbach
1938, 96).
Thus the question whether or not abstracta exist is settled by a decision. The
78 Depending upon the viewpoint, one and the same ‘thing’ may function as a
complex and as an element. Thus an atom may be called an internal element of concreta,
or a projective complex of concreta. In the former case the concreta are abstracta, in the
latter they are probabilistically inferred from the atoms. Since in this case the projection
has a somewhat peculiar character ("it leads to things which are the internal elements of
the things from which the inference started"), Reichenbach calls it an internal projection
(Reichenbach 1938, 216).
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decision may be an affirmation, or a denial, or neither of them. For example,
of a family’s furniture we probably will say that it exists, of the height of
a mountain that it does not, and in the case of human society the decision
will be somewhat indeterminate. But whatever its outcome, it remains a
decision and thus a matter of convention; on no account may the abstract
term be taken to have a surplus meaning. The question of whether or not an
abstractum exists therefore is a practical affair; regarding the matter as a
theoretical topic is to raise a pseudo-problem.79
Illata, on the other hand, form a different kettle of fish. Illata do
have an existence of their own, and terms denoting them have a surplus
meaning which goes beyond the meaning of the terms for the (external)
elements. Consider the term ‘atom’ (the example is Reichenbach’s, who after
all wrote long before the quark era). The theory of the atom emerged as a
pure speculation from the philosophy of Democritus in the fourth centry
B.C., after which it took another twenty-two centuries before it was
subjected to an empirical test. About 1800 it was found that compounds
(such as table sugar or sucrose) consist of chemical elements (carbon,
hydrogen and oxygen), of which the weights make up a fixed proportion that
can be expressed in whole numbers. The English chemist Dalton realised
that these fixed and quantitative relations require an explanation at the
microscopic level. It turned out that all macroscopic bodies are made of
microscopic particles - atoms - which combine in fixed ratios; in the case of
sugar, twelve atoms of carbon combine with twenty-two atoms of hydrogen
plus twelve atoms of oxygen. Propositions about atoms can thus be
connected to propositions about macroscopic bodies, albeit probabilistically:
the propositions about atoms may be true whereas those concerning
macroscopic bodies may be false, or vice versa.
Not all philosophers or physicists would endorse the claim that
atoms exist. Reichenbach himself mentions Ernst Mach, who believed that
the term ‘atom’ was only an abbreviation for certain relations between
macroscopic bodies; hence Mach, in Reichenbach’s terms, would hold that
the atom is a reducible complex of concreta as internal elements. On the
other hand, Ludwig Boltzmann opposed Mach’s views by declaring that
79 This is exactly the reason why Reichenbach regards the traditional controversy
between nominalists and realists as a pseudo-problem. According to Reichenbach,
nominalists and realists disagree with respect to the existence of abstracta: nominalists
deny, and realists assert that abstracta exist. Cf. Reichenbach 1938, 93-98.
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atoms do have an existence of their own, or that, in Reichenbach’s words,
"the atoms are a projective complex of concreta, and that it is no objection
against the independent reality of the atoms if a ‘direct verification’ ... is
impossible." (Reichenbach 1938, 213). Nowadays most people decide in
favour of Boltzmann. For although still we cannot see atoms as we can see
tadpoles, there is much experimental indication that their existence is as firm
as that of amphibia in their larval state.
There is, I think, a problem attached to Reichenbach’s ideas about
abstracta and illata. In Reichenbach’s view, the probabilistic character of
their connections to concreta reveals that illata really exist: "The relation of
the illata to the concreta is a projection ... The illata have, therefore, an
existence of their own ..." (Reichenbach 1938, 212; my emphasis).
Conversely, the existence of a non-concretum reveals that the latter is an
illatum. This means that, if a given non-concretum has an existence of its
own then it is a projective complex, and if it is a projective complex then
it has an existence of its own: for Reichenbach these are two sides of the
same coin.
But is it correct to infer existence from the fact that something is
a projective complex? Being a projective complex is a linguistic matter; to
say that x is a projective complex only means that propositions about x are
made probable by propositions about concreta. Existence, on the other hand,
is an ontological issue; to say that an x exists is making a claim de re. Thus
the question of whether or not x exists differs from the question of whether
or not statements about x are probabilistically connected to statements about
concreta. Strictly speaking, both questions are mutually independent. It is at
least curious to infer the one from the other.
The problem on which I am trying to lay my finger is better
perceived when we compare Reichenbach’s abstracta and illata with
Carnap’s distinction between pure dispositions and theoretical entities. This
comparison is established in 3, where I discuss the similarities in 3.1 and
3.2, and the differences in 3.3. Section 3 serves as a clarification of the
difficulty described above; to that extent it is of no relevance to readers for
whom the difficulty is clear enough, and they may as well skip the entire
section. In Section 4 I examine the question whether psychological




3. Reichenbach and Carnap
When in Chapter III I pondered Carnap’s definition of disposition terms in
terms of reduction sentences, I referred to his writings of the mid-thirties. At
that time Carnap distinguished between simple dispositions (defined by only
one reduction pair) and broad or multiple dispositions (defined by sets of
reduction pairs). For reasons that I shall explain soon, Carnap replaced that
distinction twenty years later by a distinction that became much better
known, namely that between pure dispositions and theoretical constructs, or,
as Carnap prefers to call the latter, theoretical primitives (Carnap 1956).
As is generally known, the latter distinction concerns two kinds of
scientific concepts; basically it relies on the much praised distinction
between an observation language, LO, and a theoretical language, LT.
Theoretical terms cannot be explicitly defined in LO and are thus introduced
in LT by means of postulates. On the other hand, pure disposition terms
occupy an intermediate position between observation terms and theoretical
terms. They belong neither to LO nor to LT, but are part of a language in
between the two: Carnap’s extended observation language L’O.
As do the terms that denote abstracta and illata, disposition terms
and theoretical terms similarly signify non-observable or non-concrete
complexes. Hence the question arises how these distinctions are related to
one another. What exactly is the correspondence between Reichenbachian
abstracta/illata and Carnapian pure dispositions/theoretical primitives? I shall
answer this question in 3.1 - 3.3. More particularly, I shall discuss three
similarities and one difference. As we will see, it is notably the difference
between Carnap and Reichenbach that may clarify the problem I described
in 2.3. For whereas Reichenbach runs into the problem by inferring
ontological from linguistic claims, Carnap does not.
3.1 Three similarities
Carnap’s distinction between pure dispositions and theoretical primitives can
be explained as follows. A disposition D ascribed to an object X by an
investigator Y is a pure disposition if and only if there exist an S and an R
such that:
(i) S is a process that affects X and is observable by Y,
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(ii) R is a reaction of X and likewise observable by Y,
(iii) D is identical to (a certain combination of) S and R.
On the other hand, D is a theoretical primitive or, as I shall call it, a
theoretical disposition if D is manifested by S and R, but does not coincide
with S and R. This means that D is a theoretical disposition if (i) and (ii) are
true whereas (iii) is false. Consequently, theoretical dispositions are only
probabilistically connected to concreta. It is precisely the existence of
probabilistic relations that constitutes the difference between pure and
theoretical dispositions:
"The decisive difference is this: on the basis of the
theoretical interpretation, the result of this or of any other
test or, generally, of any observations, external or internal,
is not regarded as absolutely conclusive evidence for the
state in question; it is accepted only as probabilistic
evidence, hence at best as a reliable indicator, i.e., one
yielding a high probability for the state." (Carnap 1956,
71; my emphasis).
That takes us to the first of the three similarities between Reichenbach’s
distinction and that of Carnap. For illata too are only made probable by "the
result of this or of any test"; they too are separated from abstracta by their
probabilistic connections to concreta. Thus both distinctions, the
Reichenbachian and the Carnapian, are based on the absence or the presence
of probability relations. Like theoretical constructs, illata are probabilistically
connected to concreta. Like pure dispositions, abstracta coincide with
structured sets of observable things or events.
The second point of similarity follows immediately from the first.
Saying that entities are only probabilistically related to concreta entails that
the terms by which those entities are denoted have a surplus meaning over
terms that denote observabilia (see Section 1 for the notion of a surplus
meaning). Thus terms signifying illata or theoretical constructs have a
surplus meaning over terms that refer to observable things or events. On the
other hand, neither terms denoting abstracta nor pure disposition terms have
a surplus meaning; those terms can be completely translated into the
vocabulary of observables.
The third resemblance between the Carnapian and the
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Reichenbachian distinction concerns their pragmatic or time-dependent
characters. Reichenbach’s example about atoms intimated that often the
nature of a particular complex is not clear a priori: it is on the basis of
empirical findings that we decide to call something an abstractum or an
illatum. As a result, previous decisions may be reconsidered in view of new
evidence, so that an illatum can become an abstractum and vice versa. The
same goes for the question of whether something is a pure disposition or a
genuine theoretical primitive. Scientists have a certain liberty in regarding
non-concrete terms either as dispositional or as theoretical terms; their
ultimate decision is mainly guided by considerations of usefulness and
efficiency. This goes not only for physical and chemical dispositions, but
also for dispositions in psychology:
"In analogy to what I said in the previous section about
physical terms, I wish to emphasize here for psychological
terms that their interpretation as pure disposition terms is
not in itself objectionable. The question is only whether
this interpretation is in accord with the way the
psychologist intends to use the term, and whether it is the
most useful for the purpose of the whole psychological
theory." (Carnap 1956, 71).
Hence Carnap concludes that the scientist of whatever persuasion "is free to
choose this interpretation provided he is consistent in it and willing to accept
its implications" (Carnap 1956, 71). One of the implications that Carnap is
here referring to involves the closed character of pure disposition terms in
contradistinction to the open nature of theoretical terms. Before I discuss the
difference between Reichenbach and Carnap in 3.3, I take the liberty of an
elaboration on open and closed terms in 3.2. The excursion on open and
closed terms is of no relevance to my main argument, and might well be
passed over by an uninterested reader.
3.2 An excursion: open and closed terms
What does it mean to say that a term is either open or closed? As a matter
of fact, the younger Carnap answers this question differently than the older
one. The change appears to be intimately linked with Carnap’s transition
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from broad and simple dispositions to pure and theoretical ones. Let me
therefore, as an aside, devote some words to the matter. In his early work,
when he did not yet speak about theoretical terms, Carnap connected open
and closed terms to broad and simple dispositions: simple disposition terms
are always closed whereas broad dispositions terms can be either closed or
open. A broad disposition is open if, and only if, to the set of reduction pairs
by which the disposition is defined new reduction pairs can be added. These
extra pairs describe newly discovered methods to measure the disposition in
question (Carnap 1936-1937, 444-445). In the work of the young Carnap, it
is essentially the manoeuvre of adding reduction sentences that constitutes
the openness.80
80 Of course, openness is not the same as infinity, and neither is closure the same as
finiteness. Not only in mathematics is there a difference between open and infinite sets
(and also between closed and finite sets), but also in Carnap’s use of these concepts.
Since the latter somewhat deviates from the ordinary mathematical use, it is perhaps a
good idea to explain both uses here.
As for mathematics, the difference between open versus closed and finite
versus infinite touches the difference between topology and set theory: ‘open’ and
‘closed’ are topological concepts whereas ‘finite’ and ‘infinite’ are set theoretical
notions. The difference can be further explained as follows. A set of elements, S, other
than the null set (which contains no elements) is said to be finite if the elements of any
proper subset of S cannot be put into one-to-one relation with the elements of S. If, on
the contrary, there exists at least one proper subset which can be put into such a one-to-
one relation, then S is said to be infinite, i.e. to contain an infinite number of elements.
On the other hand, a set, S, is closed if it contains all of its limit points; S is open if its
complement is closed. For example, take as sample space the set R:
R: {x: 0 ≤ x ≤ 1}.
R is the set of all reals between 0 and 1, including 0 and 1 themselves. Let ρ be a proper
subset of R, such that:
ρ: {x: 0 < x < 1/2}.
ρ is an open set, since its complement, ρc,
ρc: {x: x=0 or 1/2 ≤ x ≤ 1}
is closed. (Being the sample space, R is by definition closed and open at the same time.
The complement of R, namely the null set, is also both open and closed.) According to
these definitions, in mathematics, a finite set is always closed, and an open set is always
infinite. However, an infinite set can be either closed or open. Thus a set can well be
infinite and closed at the same time, as is illustrated by ρc. For although ρc contains its
limit points and hence is closed, it has a infinite number of elements.
In contradistinction to his use of the pair finite/infinite, Carnap’s use of the
pair open/closed differs from the ordinary mathematical use. For Carnap, a set of
256
Reichenbach and Carnap
However, twenty years later Carnap appeared to have abandoned
those early views on opennes. He now no longer connects openness to broad
disposition terms, but instead calls a disposition term ‘open’ if and only if
it can never be fully defined in a set of reduction pairs, no matter how large
the set may be. Looking back in placidity at his philosophy as a young man,
Carnap writes in 1956:
"At that time I tried to do justice to this openness by
admitting the addition of further dispositional rules (in the
form of reduction sentences ...). I think now that the
openness is more adequately represented in LT; whenever
additional C-rules (correspondence rules - JP) or additional
postulates are given, the interpretation of the term may be
strengthened without ever being completed." (Carnap 1956,
67).
Carnap’s new ideas about openness are accompanied by a new bifurcation
of dispositions. The previous classification of dispositions in simple and
reduction pairs is open if, and only if, new reduction pairs may be added; otherwise it is
closed. Thus Carnap’s distinction between open and closed does not (as does the
mathematical distinction) rely on the inclusion or exclusion of limit points; for Carnap, it
is the operation of adding reduction pairs that constitutes the difference. However, in
Carnap’s use too, a set can be infinite and closed at the same time.
It is interesting to note that mathematical openness implies the Carnapian idea
of openness, but that the reverse does not hold. If S is open in the mathematical sense,
then there is a limit point, , which is not contained in S. Because S is open, it follows
that:
∀x {x ∈ S → ∃y (y ∈ S & y is closer to than x is)}
which says that, for any element in S, one can always find ("add") another element
closer to . To that extent mathematical openness entails Carnapian openness. However,
the converse does not hold. The fact that a set of reduction pairs, S*, is open in Carnap’s
sense means that new pairs may be added to S*. It does not entail that S* has a limit
point, let alone a limit point not contained in it. As we shall see in the text, the elder
Carnap altered his interpretation of ‘open’ and ‘closed’. He no longer believes that a set
of reduction pairs is open if, and only if, new reduction pairs may be added. However,
the important point is that Carnap still adheres to a conceptual separation of ‘open’ and
‘infinite’. For Carnap, there is no objection in principle against a set that is closed and
infinite at the same time.
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broad ones is declared to be ineffective, since it cannot clarify the new
interpretations of ‘closed’ and ‘open’. The interpretations of those words are
now given by the classification in terms of pure and theoretical dispositions.
As we have seen above, the meanings of pure dispositions are given by sets
of reduction pairs; if the pure disposition is in addition a simple disposition,
then the set will contain one pair. On the other hand, the meaning of a
theoretical disposition necessarily transcends any set of reduction pairs. No
collection of reduction pairs, no matter how large it is, can ever be identified
with a theoretical disposition. Like Reichenbach’s illata, theoretical
dispositions are only made probable by a series of reduction sentences:
"Thus, if a scientist has decided to use a certain term ‘M’
in such a way, that for certain sentences about M, any
possible observational results can never be absolutely
conclusive evidence but at best evidence yielding a high
probability, then the appropriate place for ‘M’ in a dual-
language system like our system LO-LT is in LT rather than
in LO ..." (Carnap 1956, 69).
As a result of the probabilistic relations between reduction pairs and
theoretical dispositions, we can meaningfully affirm that a certain object X
has a disposition D, even if a test by means of a reduction pair shows a
negative result. Conversely, we may go against positive results and deny that
X has D. Of course, the same goes for Reichenbach’s illata. If certain
sentences about concreta turn out to be false, the probability relations allow
us to decide that the corresponding illatum term is applicable after all.
Turning this around, we may pronounce the illatum term inapplicable even
if the corresponding direct sentences about concreta are true.
Thus the present excursion anent open and closed terms has brought
us back to the main theme of 3, viz. that Reichenbach’s abstracta and illata
closely parallel Carnap’s pure dispositions and theoretical primitives. At least
three points of contact have caught our eye. The first and major point is that
both distinctions rely on the absence or the presence of probability relations.
Second, and as a result of the previous point, theoretical terms à la Carnap
and illata terms à la Reichenbach have a surplus meaning over sentences
about concreta. We therefore are permitted to pronounce both theoretical
terms and illata terms applicable even if the corresponding sentences about
concreta are false, or not applicable if those sentences are true. Third, both
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the Carnapian and the Reichenbachian distinctions are attained a posteriori:
the question whether something is an abstractum or an illatum is settled by
an empirically guided decision, as is the question of whether something is
a theoretical construct or a pure disposition.81
3.3 A difference
Despite the three similarities mentioned in 3.1, there is an important
difference between Carnap’s view and Reichenbach’s. We have seen that
Reichenbach connects the question of existence to the difference between
abstracta and illata. In fact, Reichenbach makes the connection so strong that
it looks like an equivalence: because illata are only probabilistically related
to concreta they have an existence of their own, and because abstracta are
81 There even seems to be a fourth common point. In the preceding footnote we have
seen that Carnap’s distinction between open and closed differs from the distinction
between infinite and finite: ‘open’ does not mean ‘infinite’ and neither does ‘closed’
mean ‘finite’. A difference between finite/infinite and closed/open remains effective,
even after Carnap’s rejection of his early views on openness and closeness. Theoretical
dispositions do not differ from pure dispositions in that they are defined by means of an
infinite set of reduction pairs. The difference is rather that theoretical dispositions (as
opposed to pure dispositions) are only probabilistically related to concreta. Whether the
number of concreta is finite or infinite is of no relevance here.
At first sight it looks as if Reichenbach’s distinction too does not coincide
with the difference between finite and infinite. For the difference between abstracta and
illata is not that the former are equivalent to finite sets of concreta, whereas the latter
equal infinite sets. Rather, the difference is that illata (as opposed to abstracta) are
probabilistically connected to concreta.
However, there is more to say about the way abstracta and illata are correlated
to finiteness and infinity. I recall that an abstractum à la Reichenbach is a set of internal
elements plus a constitutive relation: a reductive complex (such as a wall) is equivalent
to internal elements (bricks) in a certain configuration (cf. Section 2.2). This equivalence
has an important prerequisite, which, surprisingly enough, is not mentioned by
Reichenbach. It is that the elements in question should be completely given. For only if
we know all elements, can the constitutive relation be formulated with reference to those
elements alone. Thus the bricks in a specific arrangement (internal elements plus
constitutive relation) indeed make up a wall, but only if all the bricks are given.
Similarly, the notes played in a certain manner on the piano (internal elements plus
constitutive relation) indeed produce a melody, but only if all the notes are given.
Apparently, and contrary to what Reichenbach himself suggests, internal elements always
form a finite set.
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equivalent to concreta the question of their existence does not make sense.
Carnap, on the other hand, does not hold such strong views about existence.
The question whether or not something exists, Carnap argued repeatedly, can
be answered either practically or theoretically. In the first case the answer
is a decision, motivated by whatever purpose. In the second case it is related
to a linguistic framework or conceptual scheme. According to Carnap, the
only theoretical sense in which we can meaningfully state that an object X
exists is by saying that X exists according to the vocabulary and the rules of
a certain language system. Discussing existence apart from any linguistic
framework is wasting one’s time on a problem that lacks theoretical or
cognitive value - on a classical pseudo-problem, that is (Carnap 1950a; cf.
Carnap 1963a, 44-45).
The difference between Carnap and Reichenbach might also be
phrased in the following way. The Reichenbachian distinction between
abstracta and illata is a distinction on two levels, the linguistic level and the
ontological one. Accordingly, the notions of illata and abstracta have
linguistic connotations and ontological ones: in calling X an illatum you
imply not only that the term ‘X’ has a surplus meaning over terms about
concreta, but also that X has an existence of its own, and is not merely
composed of concrete things. On the other hand, Carnap’s distinction
between pure and theoretical dispositions touches only the linguistic level.
If we decide to call X a theoretical disposition, then we do indeed imply that
‘X’ has a surplus meaning over terms about concreta: ‘X’ cannot be fully
translated into the observational vocabulary. However, we do not imply that
X has an existence of its own. Such an implication would display a form of
realism which is alien to Carnap. Not that Carnap is an anti-realist; it is well
known that he is neither the one nor the other, since he deems such stances
to be metaphysical attitudes without any bearing at all on matters of science
and knowledge (Carnap 1950a; Carnap 1966). Thus whereas Reichenbach
somewhat light-heartedly infers ontological data from linguistic ones (and
vice versa), Carnap continuously opposes such inferences. According to
Carnap, we should not reason from linguistic to ontological facts since there
are no statable ontological facts per se. The only sense in which we can
meaningfully speak about ontological questions is by relating those questions
to certain linguistic frameworks, so that after all ontology itself becomes a
linguistic issue.
The difference between Carnap and Reichenbach has brought us
back to the question that I posed at the end of 2.3. Is Reichenbach’s move
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allowed? May we indeed infer from a probability connection that a certain
non-concretum really exists (and vice versa)? Or should we take the
Carnapian viewpoint that any inference between a linguistic and an
ontological level is void, on the ground that the very notion of an
ontological level lacks meaning? Or is even a third position possible? For
instance, is it possible to acknowledge inferences from one level to another,
but to deny that they have the shape that Reichenbach gives them? The latter
position would entail that an entity, X, may have an existence of its own
although the term ‘X’ is completely translatable in terms denoting concreta.
Also, it would entail the possibility that ‘X’ is only probabilistically related
to terms about concreta, but nevertheless lacks a denotatum with an
existence of its own.
I shall not dwell upon these three positions. After all that I said
about the matter that might come as a disappointment, although some
readers doubtless will find it a relief. The reason for my reticence is simple:
whether or not dispositions have an existence of their own is not my
problem. My problem concerns the possibility of akratic actions, and my
solution is based on a reconstruction of beliefs and desires as dispositions.
As we shall see, this reconstruction is entirely independent of the ontological
status of dispositions. Both the existence of dispositions and their non-
existence are compatible with my approach. Hence, I will cheerfully
continue to talk about abstracta and illata in the linguistic sense of the word,
without confusing myself with questions of existence by enunciating
ontological claims.
As far as the avoidance of ontological matters is concerned, my
approach of abstracta and illata resembles Carnap’s discussion of pure and
theoretical dispositions. Like Carnap, I stress the linguistic implications of
abstracta and illata (i.e. their probabilistic or non-probabilistic relations to
concreta), while shunning their ontological colourings (i.e. questions about
their existence). Yet I deviate from Carnap’s position in that I refuse to
outlaw the inferences from the linguistic to the ontological or the inferences
that proceed the other way around. Unlike Carnap, I hold that inferences
from one level to another may well have a meaning, and that the same goes
for the notion of an ontological level itself. The point is only that I make no
attempt to scrutinise what those meanings are. I rather concentrate on the
linguistic side of abstracta and illata and leave their ontological aspects to
one side.
In 4 I examine the place of beliefs and desires in the framework of
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abstracta and illata. In accordance with my partiality to the linguistic rather
than to the ontological, I concentrate on the semantic side of abstracta and
illata: I focus my sights on the absence or presence of probability relations
rather than on questions of existence. For me, abstracta and illata feature
only in the linguistic sphere.
4. Are beliefs and desires abstracta or illata?
Reichenbach tells us that dispositions can be either abstracta or illata. But
what about the psychological dispositions that we are interested in? What
about beliefs and desires? Are they abstracta, illata, or can they be both?
Although philosophers hardly ever talk about abstracta or illata
explicitly, their disparate opinions about beliefs and desires can be classified
by setting them alongside Reichenbach’s distinction. The resulting
classification is simple enough; philosophers end up in three different
groups: some regard beliefs and desires as abstracta, others consider them
to be illata, and still others believe that they can be either the one or the
other. Below I take a look at representatives from each group.
Representatives of the first two groups are considered in 4.1; examples of
the third group are discussed in 4.2. As the reader may be well aware, the
philosophers mentioned are often interested in the ontological side of
abstracta and illata: they make claims about the existence or non-existence
of beliefs and desires. However, that does not restrain me from adhering to
my point; for reasons that I explained above, I continue to stress the
linguistic rather than the ontological connotation of Reichenbach’s
distinction.
4.1 The first two groups
Of the philosophers belonging to the first group, the most prominent one
perhaps is Gilbert Ryle. As William P. Alston has intimated, The Concept
of Mind can be regarded as a twofold project (Alston 1971, 360-361). On the
one hand, it is an attempt to interprete mental concepts like beliefs and
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desires as dispositions rather than as as occurrences or private episodes;82
on the other, it aims to demonstrate that dispositional predicates are purely
dispositional, in the sense that they "cannot also receive an occurrent
interpretation, and vice versa" (Alston 1971, 360). Ryle appears to regard
dispositional and occurrent predicates or statements as mutually exclusive.83
Nowhere does Ryle use the words ‘illata’ and ‘abstracta’. However, it is
clear that when he speaks about "occurrences" or "states" or "processes" he
has something like illata in mind. Also, when he bandies psychological
dispositions about, he clearly refers to the phenomena that Reichenbach has
tagged abstracta. The beliefs and desires discussed in The Concept of Mind
fully coincide with sets of specific actions performed under specific
82 This can, for instance, be inferred from:
"It is being maintained throughout this book that when we characterize people
by mental predicates, we are not making untestable inferences to any ghostly
processes occurring in streams of consciousness which we are debarred from
visiting; we are describing the ways in which those people conduct parts of
their predominantly public behaviour. True, we go beyond what we see them
do and hear them say, but this going beyond is not a going behind, in the
sense of making inferences to occult causes; it is going beyond in the sense of
considering, in the first instance, the powers and propensities of which their
actions are exercises." (Ryle 1949, 50).
"To talk of a person’s mind is not to talk of a repository which is permitted to
house objects that something called ‘the physical world’ is forbidden to house;
it is to talk of the person’s abilities, liabilities, and inclinations to do and
undergo certain sorts of things, and of the doing and undergoing of these
things in the ordinary world." (Ryle 1949, 190).
83 This is, for instance, clear from:
"To possess a dispositional property is not to be in a particular state, or to
undergo a particular change; it is to be bound or liable to be in a particular
state, or to undergo a particular change, when a particular condition is
realized." (Ryle 1949, 43)
"To say that a person knows something, or aspires to be something, is not to
say that he is at a particular moment in process of doing or undergoing
anything, but that he is able to do certain things, when the need arises, or that
he is prone to do and feel certain things in situations of certain sorts." (Ryle
1949, 112).
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conditions. These sets completely exhaust the meaning of the corresponding
disposition term. Disposition terms à la Ryle lack any surplus meaning, and
hence denote abstracta.84
According to the philosophers in the second group, beliefs and
desires are not abstracta but illata. An early representative of this position
is Rom Harré. Although Harré uses the words ‘abstracta’ and ‘illata’ no
more than does Ryle, it is obvious that he regards dispositions as illata. For
he marshalls dispositions alongside "powers", and powers are intrinsic
properties going beyond mere sets of stimuli and responses. A difference
between two powers involves not only a difference in behaviour, but a
difference in nature too: "The difference between something which has the
84 Among the philosophers who argued that beliefs and desires are abstracta, we
oddly enough also find Reichenbach himself. Notwithstanding his claims that
dispositions can be either abstracta or illata, and that some mental states are illata,
Reichenbach argued that psychological dispositions are always abstracta. Thus beliefs
and desires, being psychological dispositions, are abstracta too, albeit of a special kind.
For their internal elements are not only concreta but also illata. This can be explained as
follows. Reichenbach explicitly applied his tripartite division into concreta, abstracta, and
illata to psychology:
"Psychology is a science which infers illata from concrete objects. The
inferred objects are projective complexes of these concrete objects. Since some
of the objects of psychology such as bodily feelings are accessible to the inner
tactile sense, the inferred illata in such cases are internal elements of the
observed concrete objects; it is therefore the process of internal projection
which plays a role here. The ‘higher’ psychological objects, and just those
most frequently occurring in practical psychology, i.e., psychology as needed
for daily life, are abstracta, built up of concreta and illata." (Reichenbach
1938, 247).
Thus for Reichenbach the internal states of the human body (such as brain states) are
illata. They are inferred from concrete objects of the physical world, which stand to the
inner states as either stimuli or reactions (cf. Reichenbach 1951, 263-264). If the internal
states are "accessible to the inner tactile sense" (as is for instance the case with sense
impressions), then they are also internal elements of a reductive complex, viz., a
concretum; in this case we have to do with an internal projection (for the concept
‘internal projection’, see the footnote in Section 2.3). On the other hand, psychological
complexes like beliefs and desires are abstracta. Hence each reason, being a belief/desire
pair, is an abbreviation of an entire cluster. This cluster consists of concreta (observable
stimuli or reactions) and illata (brain states or sense impressions).
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power to behave in a certain way and something which does not have that
power is not a difference between what they will do, since it is contingently
the case that their powers are, in fact, ever elicited, but it is a difference in
what they themselves now are. It is a difference in intrinsic nature." (Harré
1970, 215; first emphasis by the author, second by me). According to Harré,
the ascription of a power to a thing or a person should be analysed thus:
"X has the power to A = if X is subject to stimuli or
conditions of an appropriate kind, then X will do A, in
virtue of its intrinsic nature." (Harré 1970, 215-216;
emphasis by the author).
He then adds:
"The last clause is vital, and marks the difference between
the ascription of powers and any other kind of description.
... [T]o ascribe a power to a thing asserts only that it can
do what it does in virtue of its nature, whatever that is. It
leaves open the question of the exact specification of the
nature or constitution in virtue of which it has the power."
(Harré 1970, 215-216).
Harré is far from being the only philosopher who denies that beliefs and
desires are merely abbreviations for regularities between certain conditions
and certain actions. Another example is Fodor, who considers beliefs and
desires as internal states or events in mutual causal interaction. Still another
example is D.H. Mellor, to whom I referred at the beginning of Chapter VII.
Mellor’s claim that dispositions are properties which have not yet been
identified entails of course that the same goes for psychological dispositions;
beliefs, desires and other psychological dispositions are properties, although
we do not know yet what sort of properties. In Reichenbach’s terminology,
this means that Mellor, like Fodor and Harré, treats beliefs and desires as
illata rather than as abstracta.
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4.2 The third group
The third group probably is the largest one. It contains such disparate
authors as Raimo Tuomela, Herbert Feigl, Willard V.O. Quine, Daniel
Dennett, and Jaap van Heerden and Anton Smolenaars (Tuomela 1978b;
Feigl 1958; Quine 1974; Dennett 1987; Van Heerden and Smolenaars 1989).
According to these philosophers beliefs and desires are neither pure abstracta
(as Ryle claims) nor full-blooded illata (as Harré et al. maintain), but
something in between. As Daniel Dennett, one of the very few authors who
talks about abstracta and illata explicitly, phrases it:
"The ordinary notion of belief no doubt does place beliefs
somewhere midway between illata and abstracta ... The
ordinary notion of belief is pulled in two directions"
(Dennett 1987, 55, 57; emphasis by Dennett).
Thus beliefs and desires are supposed to have a mixed nature; they are
neither plain flesh nor pure fowl. The reason for the ambivalent nature of
beliefs and desires springs from the ambivalent nature of their niche, viz.
folk psychology. For folk psychology has a dual constitution too. It is, in the
happy locution of Dennett, "a mixed bag, like folk productions generally"
(Dennett 1987, 55). In order to get things straight, Dennett suggests splitting
messy folk psychology into two tidy theories, one in which beliefs and
desires are abstracta and one in which they are illata:
"If we want to have good theoretical entities, good illata,
or good logical constructs, good abstracta, we will have to
jettison some of the ordinary freight of the concepts belief
and desire. So I propose a divorce. Since we seem to have
both notions wedded in folk psychology, let’s split them
apart and create two new theories: one strictly abstract,
idealizing, holistic, instrumentalistic - pure intentional
theory - and the other a concrete, microtheoretical science
of the actual realization of those intentional systems - what
I will call sub-personal cognitive psychology." (Dennett
1987, 57).
The pure intentional theory deals with competence, whereas the sub-personal
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theory is about performance (Dennett 1987, 58ff, 61ff). Although folk
psychology can never be reduced to neurology or any other sub-personal
level, it is translatable into pure intentional theory. The latter theory in turn
can be "legitimized". This means that its "mentalistic" vocabulary is
provided with "rules of attribution", so that the "predictive powers" of the
mental terms manifest themselves (Dennett 1987, 67).
Dennett does not tell us what the rules of attribution consist in
precisely; instead, he calls his current views "woefully informal and
unsystematic" (Dennett 1987, 67). I for my part take the rules to be
reduction sentences. After all reduction sentences constitute an instrument
for making beliefs, desires and other dispositions operational; they are rules
that tell us how dispositions should be applied. But if Dennett’s attribution
rules indeed are reduction sentences, they should have either a probabilistic
or a non-probabilistic shape; and as we will see in Chapter IX, each of the
two options has its own difficulties.
Dennett’s opinion is shared by Jaap van Heerden and Anton
Smolenaars, although they do not mention him. However, they do cite
Herbert Feigl and Raimo Tuomela. In their spirit they argue:
"... the scientific procedure in theory building can be
characterized as an attempt to eliminate mere correlations
headed under dispositional terms. ... where scientific
progress is concerned, dispositional terms get closer and
closer to mature, realistically conceived theoretical terms.
... To ascribe a disposition to an object is ... to issue
promissory notes". (Van Heerden and Smolenaars 1989,
300-301).
The promissory notes might be redeemed; in that case the disposition is an
illatum (in the ontological sense of the word). The promises might however
also turn out to be illusory; in that case we have to do with an (ontological)
abstractum. Quine, on several occasions, has taken a similar stance. His
views on the issue were clearly expressed in the famous BBC interview that
he granted Bryan Magee. During that conversation Quine declared that his
behaviouristic attitude towards psychology has a signalling or anticipating
function; it enables us to specify problems regarding mental states and
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events in such a way that neurology might some day solve them.85 Thus
Quine expects that somewhere in the future psychological theories will
gradually turn into neurological theories; by taking a behaviouristic outlook,
Quine tries to anticipate this future state. However, it might turn out that
some psychological dispositions resist reduction to neurological features. In
other words, it might appear that some dispositions are not illata but abstracta.86
85 Quine Behaviourism, mine anyway, does not say that the mental states and
events consist of observable behaviour, nor that they are explained
by behaviour. They are manifested by behaviour. Neurology is the
place for explanations, ultimately. But it is in terms of outward
behaviour that we specify what we want explained.
....
Magee What you’re really saying is that behaviourism is not a solution to
the kind of problems with which the psychologist deals, but a way
of formulating them. It’s a kind of model in terms of which the
problems should be couched before we go on to seek solutions.
Quine Yes.
(Magee 1978, 174; emphasis by Quine; cf. Quine 1974, 8-15).
86 Quine’s behaviourism in psychology can be used to shed light on the difference
between the indetermination of translation (IoT) and the underdetermination of theories
(UoT). For UoT reflects Quine’s psychological behaviourism, and that behaviourism
differs considerably from Quine’s linguistic behaviourism, which is mirrored in IoT. This
can be clarified as follows.
After Quine’s introduction of IoT in Quine 1960, there has been a steady flow
of articles on it. Many of the articles aim to demonstrate that IoT is not a genuine
novelty compared to UoT. Whereas IoT implies that we may have logically incompatible
translations without being able to determine which is the right one, UoT implies that we
may have logically incompatible theories without being able to devise a crucial
experiment. Thus IoT would at best be only a special case of UoT: indeterminacy would
merely be underdetermination applied to the field of linguistics (Chomsky 1969).
Time and again Quine opposed such arguments by explaining that IoT does
differ essentially from UoT (Quine 1969a, 47; Quine 1969b, 303; Quine 1970, 180;
Quine 1981, 23; Quine 1987, 10). Notwithstanding the frequency with which they have
been put forward, Quine’s arguments appeared to have been poorly understood
(Bergström 1990; Gemes 1991). As I explained in the footnote to Section 3.2.2 of
Chapter IV, I believe that these misunderstandings stem from the failure to distinguish
between psychology and linguistics, between theories about the human mind and
manuals of translations.
For Quine, there is a vital difference between linguistics and psychology,
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What to think of the position occupied by the philosophers in the
third group? What to think of the idea that some beliefs and desires are
abstracta while others are illata? At first sight, I think, it sounds sensible
enough. It is only natural to assume that some beliefs and desires are
abstracta while others are illata. Examples are easy to find. Politeness and
prosperity are both abstracta; it is unlikely that these dispositions ever will
be more than abbreviations for a cluster of responses which appear under
certain circumstances. Aggressivity and claustrophobia, on the other hand,
between scientists and translators, between manuals of translation and mental theories.
The essential difference can well be explained in terms of the Reichenbachian distinction
between abstracta and illata. Mental theories are about beliefs and desires, which, see the
text, can be abstracta or illata. Translation manuals, on the other hand, are about
meanings. According to Quine’s linguistic behaviourism, meanings are shorthand terms
for clusters of observable events, notably stimuli and responses. Therefore, and in
contradistinction to beliefs and desires, meanings must be abstracta. Consequently, two
empirically equivalent theories can be rivals on the level of illata (they assume the
existence of different illata), whereas two empirical manuals can be rivals only on the
level of abstracta (they have different ways of ‘slicing’ the observable world). Therefore
it does make sense to ask which of the two theories is correct, whereas it is pointless to
ask which of the manuals is correct. In the Quinean nomenclature: in the first case there
is a fact of the matter whereas in the second there is not.
Another way of saying this is by stating that Quine’s psychological
behaviourism differs considerably from his linguistic behaviourism. His psychological
behaviourism leaves open the possibility that mental theories turn into neurological
theories; such a turn occurs when the beliefs and desires in question appear to be illata.
His linguistic behaviourism, however, prohibits the transformation of translation manuals
into neurological theories, for by Quinean lights it is impossible that linguistics will ever
be replaced by neurology. Hence Quine’s linguistic behaviourism is his whole story
about linguistics in general; in no way is it an anticipation of an ideal future theory, be it
a neurological theory or a theory in which meanings as illata are assumed. On the other
hand, Quine’s psychological behaviourism is an anticipation of an ideal theory, viz., a
theory in which all kinds of arrangements and interactions of small bodies (i.e. illata) are
assumed.
Still another way of explaining the basic difference between a translator and a
scientist is by stressing the indispensability of the former. Even if we were to have an
ideal neurological theory by which we could explain every utterance of every person in
neurological terms, we would still be in need of a translation manual if we want to link
sentences such as, for instance, "Willard aime bien les lapins, surtout avec une bonne
sauce à l’ail" with "Willard liebt die Kaninchen sehr, besonders mit einer guten
Knoblauchsosse".
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presumably are illata; it is quite possible that future research will identify
frequent aggressive behaviour as caused by a chemical substance or a
physical entity (the pugnacity lobule? the truculence neuron?).
But again, on closer consideration difficulties occur. For the idea
that reasons are abstracta or illata cannot circumvent the akrasia problem.
No matter whether we decide to call all reasons abstracta, illata, or both
(thus joining the first, second or third group), we will encounter the akrasia
problem anyway. This will be explained in the next and final chapter.
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